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The discrepancy between integrated circuits' activities in normal functional mode 
and that in structural test mode has an increasingly adverse impact on the effec-
tiveness of manufacturing test. By identifying functionally-unreachable states in 
the circuit and avoiding them during the test generation process, pseudo-functional 
testing is an effective technique to address this problem. Existing methods, how-
ever, can only extract a small set of illegal states in the system due to various lim-
itations. In addition, to avoid violating functional constraints, pseudo-functional 
patterns typically feature much fewer dont-care bits when compared to conven-
tional structural patterns, making them less friendly to the de-facto test compres-
sion techniques widely-used in the industry. 
To address the above issues, in this thesis, we first show that illegal states in a 
circuit are mainly caused by multi-fanout nets in it, and we develop efficient and 
effective heuristics to identify them. Then, we introduce our solutions to apply 
pseudo-functional tests in linear decompressor-based test compression environ-
ment, which is able to achieve similar fault coverage as conventional structural 
patterns, without incurring over-testing to the circuits neither sacrificing test com-
pression ratio loss. The effectiveness of IC tests can be significantly enhanced 
with the proposed techniques that bridge the gap between manufacturing test and 
functional operation of the circuit under test. 
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1.1 Manufacturing Test 
Integrated circuit (IC) fabrication is an extremely complex process, and it is in-
evitable that some manufactured chips are defective, due to various hard-to-controlled 
factors (e.g., impure material, temperature variation and quantum effect). Semi-
conductor industry thus relies on manufacturing test to identify those defect-free 
ICs and ship them to customers. 
Manufacturing test is typically conducted with the help of automatic test equip-
ment (ATE). When testing a circuit, both test patterns and the expected test re-
sponses are stored in the ATE. During the manufacturing test process, test patterns 
are transported from ATE to the circuit, and then the actual responses captured 
by the circuit are sent back to ATE to compare against the expected responses. 
Those circuits that have different responses from the expected ones are marked as 
defective products. 
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1.1.1 Functional Testing vs. Structural Testing 
Functional testing was historically used to test IC products, wherein a large amount 
of test patterns are required to completely excise the circuit's functionalities. Gen-
erally speaking, the number of input patterns for functional testing will be 2" for a 
circuit with n inputs. Taking a 64-bit ripple-carry adder as example, patterns 
are needed to apply complete functional test, which would take 2.158 x years 
to finish such test on a 1 GHz ATE [4], Due to such exhaustive nature of functional 
testing, it is impractical for any reasonable-sized circuits. In addition, due to the 
need of applying functional tests at speed, the functional tester is much more ex-
pensive. The semiconductor industry hence mainly resorts to structural testing for 
this duty, wherein test patterns are selected based on circuit structural information 
and a set of fault models. One of the greatest advantages of structural test is that it 
allows us to develop structural search algorithms to achieve efficient testing. For 
the same 64-bit ripple-carry adder, 1728 patterns are enough for structural testing 
based on stuck-at fault model (introduced later). 
Defects in an electronic system is defined as the unintended differences be-
tween the implemented hardware and its intended design [4]. It is very hard to 
generate tests for every possible type of physical defects. Fault models, therefore, 
are proposed to abstract faulty behaviors induced by defects. To generate test pat-
terns effectively, faults are always modeled at a certain level of design abstraction, 
such as behavioral level, logic/gate level or transistor level. Fault models at behav-
ioral level usually have no clear correlation to manufacturing defects and hence are 
used more often in design verification rather than manufacturing test. Transistor 
level fault models are also known as technology-dependent faults and are mainly 
used in analog circuit testing. Fault models at logic level (i.e., circuit is modeled 
as an interconnection of boolean gates, called netlist) are technology-independent 
and over time have been proven to be quite efficient and effective for testing digital 
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Figure 1.1: An Example Path Delay Fault 
circuits [4]. Here, we introduce two main kinds of fault models that 
used in the industry. 
widely-
1.2 Fault Model 
• Stuck-at Fault Model 
Stack-at fault model is the fundamental fault model used in IC testing, which 
assumes a single line of the logic network to be stuck at a logic 0 (s-a-0) or 
logic 1 (s-a-1). 
• Delay Fault Model 
Delay faults model those defects that cause the combinational delay of a cir-
cuit to exceed its clock period. Commonly-used delay fault models include 
the transition fault model (also called gross-delay fault model) and the path 
delay fault model. Transition fault model is based on the assumption that 
only a single gate delay is changed. It has the advantages of easy test pattern 
generation and comparably small test set size, but it is less accurate due to 
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its simplistic assumption. Path delay fault model, on the other hand, consid-
ers the cumulative propagation delay of a combinational path and hence is 
much more accurate, but test pattern generation for path delay faults is quite 
complicated and it is also associated with a large number of test patterns due 
to the exponential number of paths in a sequential circuit. 
Fig. 1.1 depicts an example path delay fault. In this example, the targeted 
fault is on path {FF1,A,D,F,G,FF4}, which is manifested by the cumu-
lated delay induced by propagating transitions on this path. To sensitize 
such transitions, two consecutive patterns < 1,0,1;X, 1,1 > need apply on 
{FF0,FF\,FF2}. The correct response for this circuit at output FF4 is 
< 1 ; 0 � . Due to the fact that delay on the targeted path exceeds clock pe-
riod, logic 0 cannot arrive at FF4 before the capture clock edge. The faulty 
response is therefore < 1; 1 > at FF4. 
It is important to note, as technology scales, at-speed delay testing has become 
increasingly popular to ensure the quality of shipped products. 
1.1.3 Automatic Test Pattern Generation 
Given a fault model, the task of automatic test pattern generation (ATPG) tool is 
to find out vectors that can activate the targeted faults and propagate their faulty 
effects to observable outputs. In essence, most structural ATPG algorithms are 
based on branch-and-bound principle, which try to quickly find a solution to detect 
targeted faults and backtrack immediately when some pre-determined values at 
circuit nodes are found to be infeasible. According to the nature of the circuit in 
test mode, it can be categorized into combinational ATPG and sequential ATPG. 
Both have been proved to be NP-Complete problem [4], 
• Combinational ATPG 
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Combinational ATPG is the fundamental problem for IC testing and it has 
been subject to extensive research over the past decades. In the following we 
list a few milestone work in this area: (i) D-algorithm proposed by Roth [28], 
which established the calculus and algorithms for ATPG using D-cubes; (ii) 
Goel's PODEM algorithm [10] proposed to use path propagation constraints 
to efficiently limit the search space of the ATPG engine; (iii) Fujiwara and 
Shimono's FAN algorithm further improved the efficiency of ATPG and is 
widely used in the industry. The basic idea of this technique is to detect 
infeasible solutions as early as possible so that the processing time between 
backtracks can be significantly reduced. 
• Sequential ATPG 
For circuits with state elements that cannot be directly controlled in test 
mode, sequential ATPG is required when generating test patterns. Generally 
speaking, sequential ATPG is much more complicated than combinational 
ATPG. This is because: (i). the test responses of the circuit are dependent 
not only on input test pattern, but also on the initial states of the circuit's 
sequential elements; (ii). activating a fault from primary outputs requires 
the circuit to be driven to a known state, which itself requires more than one 
pattern and essentially involves multiple combinational ATPG procedure; 
(iii). propagating faulty effects to primary outputs also takes multiple clock 
cycles and incurs high computational complexity. 
It is worth to note that, test patterns generated from ATPG process typically 
feature a large percentage of "dont-care" bits (also known as X-hits) and they can 
be assigned to any logic value without affecting the fault coverage of the test set. 
Fig. 1.2 presents the flowchart for a typical ATPG framework, containing two 
stages. In the first stage, random patterns are generated and fault simulation is 
conducted in the hopes that some easy-to-detect faults can be covered by such pat-
Fault list 
No 
Fault simulation o 
pattern 
random 
. R a n d o m 
I Pat tern Faul t 
I S imula t ion 
(^ Terminat^  
Figure 1.2: Flowchart of General ATPG Process 
terns. This process continues until no fault can be detected by random patterns. 
Next, deterministic ATPG is used for those random-resistant faults. Since a test 
pattern generated by ATPG can potentially detect several other faults, fault simu-
lation is again applied for every pattern. The whole flow terminates when all faults 
are detected or we have reached the runtime limit for the ATPG process. 
1.1.4 Design for Testability 
DfT is the design process which embeds special hardware for testing purpose only. 
This section presents the de-facto DfT techniques widely-used in the industry. 
Scan-Based DfT 
With the ever increasing transistor-to-pin ratio in IC products, sequential ATPG is 
no longer applicable on today's complex sequential circuits. The main purpose for 
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Figure 1.3: Transform the D Flip-Flop to Scan Flip-Flop 
scan-based DfT is to increase the controllability (i.e., the ability to set a particu-
lar circuit node to logic ‘0，or logic ‘1，）and the observability (i.e., the ability to 
observe the state of a logic signal within the circuit) of the circuit's internal node 
so that it is easier to generate test patterns for the circuit. In scan-based circuits, 
we substitute normal flip-flops (FFs) with scan FFs (SFFs), making them directly 
accessible in test mode. By doing so, from the test generation point of view, the 
circuit under test is a combinational circuit and hence the more tractable combina-
tional ATPG can be used to generate test patterns. 
SFFs can be implemented in various manners, e.g., mux-based SFFs, double 
latched SFFs, level sensitive scan latches SFFs [1，4]. Fig. 1.3 depicts the trans-
formation from a normal FF into a mux-based SFF. In the mux-based SFF, a mul-
tiplexor is inserted before the input of the FF with two inputs D and SD, which 
represent the original data input and the scan data input, respectively. Scan enable 
(SE) signal is used to select which channel as input of FF. By replacing normal 
FFs with SFFs, these state elements can be connected serially to form one or more 
long shift registers (called scan chain) through SD input, and the first and the last 
SFF of each scan chain are connected with an input pin and an output pins of the 
circuit. All the SFFs can be set as arbitrary states by shifting logic values into the 
scan chains. Similarly, the states of these SFFs can be observed by shifting out the 
contents of the shift registers. 
























Figure 1.4: Linear Decompressor-Based Test Compression Infrastructure 
The test procedure in scan-based testing can be divided into three phases. 
• Scan in: SE signal is asserted to configure the circuit as scan mode. Test 
pattern is then shifted into scan chains for Ngc clock cycles, where Ngc is the 
length of longest scan chain; 
• capture: SE signal is de-asserted, and the circuit applies the test pattern in 
functional mode and capture its responses into the same SFFs; 
• Scan out: test responses are shifted out in the similar manner as the scan in 
process. 
Test Data Compression 
The rapidly-growing test data volume has becmoe a serious concern for the in-
dustry because it not only prolongs the ICs，testing time, but also raises memory 
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depth requirements for the ATE. Test data compression, consisting of test stimulus 
compression at the input side and test response compaction at the output side, has 
become the de facto test strategy for today's large circuits. 
For test stimulus compression, various techniques (as surveyed in [34]) have 
been proposed in the literature, all of which exploit the large amount of X-bits in 
the given test cubes to reduce test data volume. Among the existing TDC method-
ologies, linear decompressor-based technique is the most popular one used in the 
industry due to its ease of implementation and high compression ratio (e.g., [2, 25, 
35，37]). 
As shown in Fig. 1.4，a typical linear decompressor consists of a n-bit finite 
state machine that receives a-bit input variables from the ATE to generate test 
sequences and a phase shifter (typically implemented with XOR network) used 
to expand these sequences to a large amount of scan chains with reduced linear 
dependencies. In each clock cycle, b-bit (b » a) values are shifted into scan 
slices. Typically, a two-pass ATPG flow is utilized to generate compressible test 
patterns. That is, after ATPG generates a test cube, a linear solver is invoked to 
compress it. If the solver cannot find a solution, a different test cube would be 
generated to target the fault. 
Traditionally, for test response compaction, multiple input signature register 
(MISR) is used to generate a small signature. This simple compactor, however, 
suffers from fault coverage loss due to aliasing and unknown logic values in test 
responses (e.g., due to bus contention and multiple clock domains). To tackle the 
above problem, a number of X-tolerant compactors were proposed [8, 22, 23，26, 
33, 36], which are able to tolerate a small percentage of X-bits in test responses 
at the cost of higher DfT overhead and less compaction ratio. Generally speak-
ing, with the growth of X-bits, the compaction ratio is decreased and the silicon 
area used to tolerate these X-bits increases. Therefore, the number of X's in test 
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Figure 1.5: An Example Linear Decompressor 
responses cannot be too high. 
Linear Algebra in Decompressor and Compactor 
In linear decompressor-based TDC technique, we generate the large-sized deter-
ministic test cubes by expanding small input variables. We use an example linear 
decompressor shown in Fig. 1.5 to demonstrate the test compression process. For 
the sake of simplicity, we omit phase shifter in this example. 
The inputs supplied to the linear decompressor are comprised of the initial state 
of the linear FSM and the input variables coming from the ATE; while the output 
from the linear decompressor is the actual test pattern applied to the circuit. The 
structure of the linear decompressor can be represented by a transformation matrix 
and it determines the linear relationship between the input vector and the output 
vector M xV = P, as shown in the following: 
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It is important to note that, for each deterministic test cube, we only need to 
solve a subset of linear equations that correspond to the specified bits in P. Suppose 
we are given a test cube a s P = ( l X O X A ' X 1 X X 1 X X)^, by omitting those 
equations that correspond to X-bits, we have Ms xV = Ps as: 
0 0 
0 0 














According to linear algebra theory, the above equation system is solvable if 
and only if the coefficient matrix Ms has the same rank as that of the correspond-
ing augmented matrix (Mj|Pv)- Gaussian elimination is a widely used algorithm 
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to find the rank of a matrix, which reduce a matrix to row echelon form by ele-
mentary row operations. After conducting it, we can obtain the following reduced 
augmented matrix 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
(1.3) 
We name M'^ and P'^ as reduced coefficient matrix and reduced result column, 
respectively. The first non-zero entry in each row of is called a pivot, and its 
corresponding column is a pivot column (in bold) which only includes one non-
zero entry. Consequently, the test pattern is compressible if and only if the reduced 
result column P'^  is not a pivot column. 
For test response compaction, in addition to traditional compactors based on 
multiple input signature registers (MISR), a number of compactors have been pro-
posed to handle fault coverage loss due to aliasing and unknown logic values in 
test responses (e.g., arise from bus contention and multiple clock domains). We 
briefly introduce the X-compact technique presented in [22J here as it is used in 
this thesis work. X-compactor in [22] is essentially a combinational XOR network 
that can be also represented as a transformation matrix. The authors proved that it 
is able to detect k\ error bits in present of any hi X-bits within a single scan slice. 
Consequently, with the help of such circuit-independent compactor, it is not nec-
essary to store the transformation matrix of compactor during the ATPG process. 
Instead, we only need to control the number of X-bits in every scan slice and the 
number of bits used to detect error in it. Obviously, with the increase of k\ and 
k2, the DfT area overhead for the compactor increases and the compaction ratio is 
reduced. 







Figure 1.6: Fault Classification 
Pseudo-Functional Manufacturing Test 
The manufacturing test itself, unfortunately, is also not perfect. On one hand, as 
it is impossible to model all the possible manufacturing defects and generate test 
patterns for them, some bad chips may pass the test, leading to test escapes. On 
the other hand, since a circuit in test mode oftentimes operates differently from the 
one in functional mode, some good chips that would work in application may fail 
the test and are marked as defective, leading to test overkills. 
We can classify manufacturing defects based on their detectabilities as shown 
in Fig. 1.6 [19]. As can be observed, there might be a small number of defects 
that are functionally-testable but structurally-untestable (FT-SU). For instance, in-
serting test logic between random logic and RAM blocks may cause some defects 
in the functional paths to become untestable. At the same time, there are many 
functionally-untestable while structurally-testable (FU-ST) defects. This is mainly 
due to the fact that the functional constraints existing in the circuit are possibly vio-
lated in structural test mode. Consider a finite state machine encoded with one-hot 
code, the legal combinations of values in these state elements are only those with 
a single logic 1 and all the others logic 0. Without taking this functional constraint 
into consideration, we may have structural patterns that contain multiple logic Is 
and hence are illegal in functional mode. Those defects that are detectable only 
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with such patterns are FU-ST defects. It can be also seen from the figure that not 
all structurally-testable defects are covered by test patterns due to imperfect fault 
modeling and test cost considerations. Test escapes occur for those ICs containing 
functionally-testable defects that are not covered by test patterns; while the ICs 
that would work in application but are rejected in manufacturing test become test 
overkills (also known as false rejects). Test overkills can be attributed to FU-ST 
defects covered by test patterns and/or excessive noises in test mode. 
Traditionally, the primary objective of manufacturing test is to obtain low test 
escapes in order to ensure the quality of the shipped products, and a limited num-
ber of false rejects are considered as acceptable loss. For ICs fabricated with lat-
est technology, however, at-speed testing is essential to ensure the quality of the 
shipped IC products, rendering over-testing due to the discrepancy between cir-
cuits' activities in functional mode and that in test mode a serious concern for 
the industry [27, 29, 5]. Recent design evaluations have revealed that at-speed 
scan patterns were up to 20% slower than any functional pattern [30]. Conse-
quently, some good ICs that would work in application might fail at-speed delay 
tests [21]. With today's tight profit margins, particularly for chips that go into 
consumer products, achieving a high manufacturing yield can mark the difference 
between success and failure, and just a small variation in yield percentage can 
translate to millions of dollars of revenue change. Therefore, how to reduce yield 
loss caused by test overkills has become a main concern for the industry. 
One way to reduce test overkills is to identify FU-ST delay faults in the cir-
cuit and do not target them during test generation. A significant amount of re-
search work has been conducted in this direction (e.g., [3, 6, 7，11，32]). However, 
FU-ST delay fault identification generally has the same complexity as that of se-
quential ATPG [19], which is exponential in terms of circuit's size. In addition, 
while test patterns are only generated for those functionally-testable faults in the 
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Figure 1.7: Pseudo-Functional Test Pattern Generation 
above methods, it is still possible that they incidentally detect some FU-ST faults 
and hence lead to test overkills [19]. Moreover, even for patterns that detect only 
functionally-testable faults, as we typically let them target as many faults as possi-
ble to reduce testing time, they might lead to excessive noises that could not occur 
in functional mode, again, rendering possible test overkills. 
Instead of identifying FU-ST delay faults in the circuits, Lin et al. [16] pro-
posed the concept of pseudo-functional testing to tackle the above problem. The 
overall flow of pseudo-functional testing is illustrated in Fig. 1.7，wherein functional-
like patterns were generated for manufacturing test by identifying illegal states 
(i.e., functionally-unreachable states, we refer the functional constraints as the 
constraints that test pattern cannot include functionally-unreachable states) in func-
tional mode and avoiding them during the test pattern generation process. 
One of the key issues in pseudo-functional testing is to identify illegal states. 
In [16, 17], Lin et al. used a sequential boolean satisfiability (SAT) solver [20] 
to extract the functional constraints in the system. Wu and Hsiao [38] proposed 
a mining-based strategy for illegal state identification. In this scheme, the circuit 
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is expanded to multiple time-frames first and then simulated with a number of 
random patterns. By analyzing the obtained data, some suspicious functional con-
straints are extracted and they use SAT solver to verify whether they are actually 
functionally-illegal. Zhang et al [39] proposed an implication-based technique 
for illegal state identification, which try to detect values combination on FFs to 
imply impossible logic scenario on a single gate (e.g. both input and output of a 
NOT gate are logic，1’). 
When illegal states are available, the constrained ATPG process can be con-
ducted as shown in [17], in which illegal states are represented as clauses in con-
junctive normal form (CNF), for example {A(0)八5(0)} V {A(l) A5( l ) AC(1)}. 
Whenever the ATPG engine tries to assign value on an FF, say A = 0’ all the clauses 
including A(0) are first extracted (e.g., {A(0),5(0)}). If B is the only un-assigned 
FF in this clause, ATPG automatically assign B to be logic ‘ 1 ’ to satisfy this func-
tional constraint. Because of this, pseudo-functional test patterns typically feature 
much fewer X-bits when compared to conventional structural test patterns without 
considering functional constraints. 
1.3 Thesis Motivation and Organization 
It is important to note that, pseudo-functional test patterns do not necessarily guar-
antee to be within the functionally-reachable space even after imposing functional 
constraints, because the set of extracted illegal states is usually incomplete and 
thus a subset of the complete illegal-state set (see Fig. 1.8). Therefore, whether we 
could minimize the discrepancy between functional mode and test mode highly re-
lies on whether we could effectively identify as complete illegal states as possible. 
Although the SAT-based technique can ensure the completeness, such a brute-force 
method can only be applied to a small circuit (or a sub-circuit) at a time. Other 
existing methods cannot even answer the question "how far are they from the com-
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ctionally-Reachable 
Figure 1.8: Illustration of Incomplete Identified Illegal State 
pleteness?". Motivated by the above challenges, the first part of this thesis tries to 
investigate the fundamental problem of why there are illegal states in the system 
from the structural point of view. Such root cause analysis is important since the 
solution space for illegal state identification can be significantly reduced without 
sacrificing its completeness. 
Recently, test compression has become the de facto DfT methodology to han-
dle the growth of test data [25, 34]. As discussed earlier, to avoid a large amount 
of illegal states, the percentage of X-bits in pseudo-functional patterns can be quite 
low. This has a severe impact on the effectiveness of test data compression tech-
niques, since they mainly exploit X-bits in test cubes to achieve significant test 
volume reduction without sacrificing fault coverage. Therefore, how to effectively 
apply pseudo-functional patterns in test compression environment is another rele-
vant problem for the success of pseudo-functional testing and it is the focus of the 
second part of this thesis work. 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the 
theorem and proof for the structural root cause of illegal state. Based on this, 
effective and efficient algorithms are proposed to systematically identify illegal 
states in the circuit under test. Next, Chapter 3 describes our solutions to apply 
pseudo-functional tests in linear decompressor-based test compression environ-
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ment, which is able to achieve similar fault coverage as conventional structural 
patterns, without incurring over-testing to the circuits and sacrificing test compres-
sion ratio loss. Finally, chapter 4 concludes this thesis and points out our future 
research directions. 
• End of chapter. 
Chapter 2 
On Systematic Illegal State 
Identification 
2.1 Introduction 
Pseudo-functional testing seems to have great potential for resolving the discrep-
ancy problem between structural test mode and functional mode. However, whether 
we could realize this potential highly relies on whether we could effectively iden-
tify as many illegal states as possible. That is, if the extracted illegal states are far 
from complete, there is still a high possibility that the generated pseudo-functional 
test patterns are not within the circuit's functionally-reachable space, which inval-
idates the objective of pseudo-functional testing. 
Several approaches were proposed for illegal state identification in the litera-
ture, including SAT-based methods [16], implication-based strategies [31, 39], and 
mining-based techniques [38]. None of the above techniques, however, answers 
the fundamental question why some states are functionally-unreachable from a 
structural point of view. They also have their own specific limitations and can only 
extract a small set of illegal states in the circuit (detailed in chapter 2.2). Conse-
19 
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quently, for the success of pseudo-functional testing, more effective techniques are 
required for illegal state identification. 
In this chapter, we propose novel solutions to tackle the above problem. The 
contributions of our work include: 
• we show that the illegal states in circuit are mainly caused by the multi-
fanout nets in the circuit. 
• we propose novel algorithms that are able to effectively identify much more 
functionally-unreachable states when compared to state-of-the-art techniques. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Chapter 2.2 reviews re-
lated prior work and motivates this chapter. In Chapter 2.3, we study the structural 
root cause for illegal states. The main flow and the key concept for the proposed 
illegal state identification scheme are then detailed in Chapter 2.4 and Chapter 
2.5, respectively. Next, Chapter 2.6 presents our experimental results on several 
ISCAS'89 benchmark circuits. Finally, Chapter 2.7 concludes this chapter. 
2.2 Preliminaries and Motivation 
Illegal state identification has been studied in the context of sequential ATPG in 
several earlier works [12,14], wherein they were used to prune the search space for 
sequential tests. In [12], known illegal states are used to generate larger candidate 
illegal spaces by eliminating one assignment in the illegal states at a time and 
trying to justify them. [14], on the other hand, identified invalid states by exploring 
all valid states through simulation from an unknown initial state. These techniques 
used in sequential ATPG are not practically viable for today's large ICs due to their 
extremely high computational complexity. 
In [16], Lin et al. used a sequential boolean satisfiability (SAT) solver to extract 
the functional constraints in the system. While theoretically a SAT solver is able 
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to find almost all the unreachable states in a circuit, its computational complexity 
is extremely high and hence cannot be applied to a large circuit. Therefore, the au-
thors in [16] proposed to divide the flip-flops (FFs) in the circuit into a number of 
much smaller groups based on topological analysis and the targeted fault informa-
tion, each containing few FFs only (e.g., less than 10)，and run a SAT solver within 
each group to identify illegal states. Apparently, it is possible that functional con-
straints exist among different groups and this method cannot identify such kind 
of illegal states. Moreover, the SAT solver might still abort the computation even 
within a small group of FFs. 
Zhang et al. [39] proposed an implication-based technique for illegal state 
identification. The method starts from any gate, say gate A, and finds the implica-
tions when its output value is logic '1’ and logic ‘0’，respectively. Suppose B and C 
are internal flip-flops in the circuit, and there exist two implications: [A(0) —>5(1) 
(i.e., A = 0 implies B = \) and [A(l) C(0)]’ we then have [5(0) 一 A(l)] and 
C(l) — A(0)] according to the contrapositive law. Consequently, we can con-
clude {5(0),C(l)} is an illegal state cube. The approach proposed in [39] also 
considered the implications from impossible input-output combinations (e.g., for 
a 2-input AND gate, when an input is logic ‘0’ while the output is logic ‘1，). 
To keep the computational complexity manageable, their approach implies val-
ues based on a single node in one time-frame only. This, however, significantly 
restricts the number of identified illegal states. 
Syal et al. [31] considered multi-node functional constraints obtained through 
sequential implications, which cannot be identified within a single time-frame as 
in [39]. They also advocated to represent illegal states in the form of boolean ex-
pressions on arbitrary nets in the circuit instead of values on the state elements. 
Unlike what the authors claimed, however, using this representation may increase 
the storage overhead for the constraints significantly, because the number of arbi-
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trary nets is much larger than the number of state elements in the circuit and lots 
of their obtained functional constrains are redundant in nature. 
Recently, Wu and Hsiao [38] proposed a mining-based illegal state identifica-
tion strategy. In this work, the circuit is expanded to multiple time-frames first and 
then simulated with a number of random patterns. By analyzing the obtained data, 
some suspicious functional constraints are extracted and they use a SAT solver 
to verify whether they are actually functionally-unreachable. While this dynamic 
learning method accelerates the search procedure, due to the large amount of data, 
it can only check pair-wise and three-node relations within small groups of state 
elements and hence cannot find many illegal states in the system. 
To sum up, identifying illegal states using SAT-based [16] or mining-based 
techniques [38] can be classified as brute-force approaches, which can only be ap-
plied to one small sub-circuit at a time. Implication-based methods [31, 39] that 
consider circuit structural information to tackle this problem seem more promis-
ing. Unfortunately, none of them answers the fundamental question why there are 
illegal states in the system from the structural point of view. Finding the root cause 
of illegal states is extremely important for this problem, as with this information 
the solution exploration space can be significantly reduced without sacrificing its 
completeness. This facilitate pseudo-functional testing to be applicable to real in-
dustrial designs. It is the above observation that motivates this work. 
2.3 What is the Root Cause of Illegal States? 
Let us examine an example circuit as shown in Fig. 2.1 to demonstrate our struc-
tural root cause analysis for illegal states. This is the gate netlist of a finite state 
machine that contains six illegal state cubes (see Fig. 2.1). A closer observation of 
the circuit shows that except {FF2(0),FF3{0) ,FF4(0)}, all the other five illegal 
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Figure 2.1: Unreachable State Analysis 
justify illegal state {FF2(1),FF3(0),FF4(0)}. First, we can learn Input0{0) and 
0(0) through OR gate Q, and G(l) and FFO(O) through OR gate N. We can then 
derive 7(0) and A:(0) through OR gate O and H(\) through the inverter H. Next, 
FFl(O) is justified through AND gate J. Finally, we can infer InputO{l) through 
AND gate P with FFl(O) and FF4{0), which, however, contradicts to the afore-
mentioned {/npMrO(O)} justified through another fanout going through gate Q. On 
the other hand, although the illegal state cube {FF2(0),FF3(0),FF4(0)} do not 
imply any logic violation at a multi-fanout net directly, it actually infers another 
illegal state cube {FFO(\),FF\{\)}. In other words, this particular illegal state 
also causes logic violation on a multi-fanout net Inputi implicitly, which occurs at 
another time frame. This example motivates us to consider whether multi-fanout 
nets are the main root cause of illegal states. 
Definition 1 Consider a circuit that does not contain any multi-fanout nets, de-
noted as circuit C. FFi is the i仇 flip-flop in circuit C. The flip-flop set ^ contains 
all flip-flops that do not belong to any sequential loop. The flip-flop set Lj contains 
all flip-flops belonging to the / h sequential loop, and 丄（X = IJj Lj) is the set of 
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Definition 2 S{FFi) is defined as the father-cone set of FFi, including all state 
elements (including both primary inputs and flip-flops) that directly determine the 
next state of FFi. Ancestor-cone set J^(FFi) includes all state elements that di-
rectly or indirectly determine the state of FFi in one or more clock cycle(s). 
Lemma 1 In circuit C, S{FFk) A 二 0 when k^n. 
proof 1 If there exist a common state element within S{FFk) and S(FFn), there 
must he a multi-fanout net in the circuit, which is conflicted with the definition of 
circuit C, 
Lemma 2 The states of any elements in Lj cannot affect the states of elements 
outside of this set. 
proof 2 Suppose there is a flip-flop FF^ belonging to the flip-flop set L, whose 
father-cone set S{FFf^) includes at least one flip-flop FFn belonging to Lj. Since 
all jiip-fiops in Lj are connected one by one to form a sequential loop, FF^ also 
belongs to the father-cone set of another flip-flop FFq in Lj. Therefore, S[FFk) 
and S{FFq) have a common state element, which contradicts Lemma 1. 
Definition 3 The sequential level of a flip-flop FFi set L is set to be the maximal 
sequential level of all state elements in S{FFi) plus one, assuming the sequential 
level of all primary inputs is 0. 
Theorem I In a circuit C, suppose the maximum sequential level of the elements 
in L is n, any state of L can be reachable within n clock cycles from the primary 
inputs. 
The above theorem proves that no functionally-unreachable states exists in the 
NLF of CS. However, it cannot guarantee the same conclusion holds true for 
sequential loop structure (i.e. some FFs are connected by combinational logic and 
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form a cycle). Consider the circuit shown in Fig. 2.2 as an example, we observe 
that if FFO and FF\ are initialized as {FF0(0),FF1(0)}, it would never escape 
from this state even if we change the states of FF2 — FF5, the other three states for 
FFO and FF\, therefore, are not reachable. Such sequential loop-induced illegal 
states are very difficult, if not impossible, to be found by any automatic illegal state 
identification method. This is because: (i). a sequential loop expands their effects 
to different sequential levels in an infinite number of time frames; (ii). which states 
are reachable depends on the initial state of the involved flip-flops. 
Fortunately, the illegal states caused by sequential loop are rare cases, because 
the conditions to form sequential loop-induced unreachable states are quite strin-
gent: (i). between any connected flip-flops on the loop, there must be a controlling 
path as shown in Fig. 2.2，which is a logical path where a controlling value can 
be directly propagated from the beginning to the end; (ii). all controlling paths 
should have transitivity, i.e., the output controlling value of a path should be the 
input controlling value of the next path. If any one of the above two conditions is 
not true, any states in the sequential loop is functionally-reachable. For example, 
in Fig. 2.2, suppose we just change the NOR gate which connects with FFO to 
an OR gate, the controlling path from FFl to FFO is broken. The value of FFO 
is not solely dependent on its previous on-loop flip-flop F F l . Starting from this 
flip-flop, we first set its value by assigning FF4 二 1 and FF5 = 1 such that FFO 
can be flipped to logic 1 and then controlling path between FFO and FFl will be 
also broken. Therefore, the state of the sequential loop in next clock cycle can be 
determined by FFl — FF5, thus can reach any state. Moreover, even for these rare 
sequential loop-induced unreachable states, their impact on testing is rather lim-
ited because the involved state elements typically span a number of clock cycles 
while we target defects in combinational logic between adjacent cycles in testing. 
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Figure 2.2: Sequential Loop-Induced Unreachable States 
Because of the above reasons, we can simply ignore the unreachable states 
caused by sequential loops without damaging the effectiveness of pseudo-functional 
testing much. 
2.4 Illegal State Identification Flow 
As discussed earlier, illegal states would imply logic violations at different branches 
of the same multi-fanout net, explicitly or implicitly. A first thought to generate 
illegal states is then to propagate contradictive logic values at different branches of 
multi-fanoiits concurrently, and find out which state cubes can justify this combi-
nation. These state cubes can then be deemed as illegal. We initially tried out for 
this intuitive method and found out it is not a good solution. This is because: (i). 
we need to avoid the case that two fanout branches with contradictive values propa-
gate through the same logic elements (as we cannot determine its value under such 
circumstances), which results in incomplete identified illegal states; (ii). as we 
need to propagate contradictive logic values at the branches of each multi-fanout 
net pairwisely, for those nets that contain a high number of branches, we need to 
propagate along each branch multiple times and it is a waste of computational ef-
forts. To resolve the above problems, instead of propagating contradictive values at 
{FF2(0) ,FF4(0) } ->FF1( l \ 
{FF2(0),FF3(0)}->FF1{1) 
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Figure 2.3: An Example Circuit for Illegal State Identification 
multi-fanout nets, we determine which state cubes can justify logic ‘1’（‘0，）at the 
multi-fanout nets independently and use this information to obtain illegal states. 
We use the an exemplar circuit shown in Fig. 2.3 to explain the main flow of the 
proposed illegal state identification scheme, as depicted in Fig. 2.4. 
Let us define the so-called justification scheme at every circuit node in the 
format of CubeO — 0 and Cubel —> 1，denoting that a state cube CubeO/Cubel 
justifies logic ‘0/1’ on this node. For example, a justification scheme FFO(l) —>• 
lnput\{Qi) in Fig. 2.3 means that FFO = 1 can justify logic ‘0’ at circuit node 
In put I. All such justification schemes are systematically built for each net be-
fore unreachable state extraction (detailed in Chapter 2.5). According to previous 
discussion, we always start from a multi-fanout net and try to derive illegal states 
using contradictory justification schemes. In this example, for the multi-fanout at 
Input], we have {F尸0(1)} lnputl(0) and {FF\(\)} — Input\{\). We can 
therefore conclude that the state cube {FFO{\) ,FF\{\)} is illegal as they justify 
contradictory values in this fanout. The above procedure needs to be conducted 
for every multi-fanout nets. 
As the illegal state cubes obtained from different paths may contain redundant 
\ 
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information (e.g., the set of illegal state cubes shown in Fig. 2.1 is not the most 
compact one), we need to remove such redundancy so that all the cubes are min-
imized and disjoint to each other. This step is conducted by gradually building 
up a hypergraph for identified illegal state cubes. That is, each flip-flop (FFx) is 
split into two vertices (FFx(O) and FFx(\)) to denote its two possible logic val-
ues, and an illegal state cube can be represented as a hyperedge that connects the 
corresponding vertices. We define the following relationships between hyperedges 
A and B: 
• if A connects to only a subset of vertices of B, we denote this relationship as 
A dominates B. Apparently, the corresponding illegal state cube for hyper-
edge A contains that of B., 
• if both A and B connect to n vertices, and among them n — 1 vertices are the 
same and the remaining one corresponds to the same flip-flop with different 
logic values, we denote this relationship as A and B complement each other. 
These two hyperedges can be replaced by a single hyperedge that connects 
to the n - 1 common vertices according to our definition. 
Every time we add a new hyperedge into the graph, we check the above re-
lationships for its related edges and finally we get a compact set of illegal state 
cubes without redundancy. For example, for the illegal state cubes shown in Fig. 
1，they can be finally compacted into five illegal state cubes: {FF0(1),FF1(1)}, 
{FF3(0) ,FF4(0)} ,{FF2(0) ,FF3(0)} ,{FF2(0) ,FF3( l ) ,FF4(0)} ,and{FF2( l ) , 
FF3(1) ,FF4(1)}, using the above method. 
Next, we expand the current illegal state cubes to the next sequential level, 
again, using the justification scheme information. For the example circuit in Fig. 2.3, 
according to structural analysis, two justification schemes at FFO and FF\ are de-
tected. We explore all possible combinations of expanded unreachable cubes, and 
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Figure 2.4: Flowchart for the Proposed Illegal State Identification Scheme 
obtain new cubes, e.g., {FF2(0),FF4(0)} and {FF2(0),FF3(0)}. As shown 
in our flowchart in Fig. 2.4，this step is conducted in a stack-like manner. That 
is, whenever we generate new illegal state cubes through expansion, they will be 
pushed into the illegal state set for later expansion as well. Compared to prior work 
that explicitly expand the circuit into a few time frames for illegal state justifica-
tion, the above procedure is able to implicitly walk through an unlimited number 
of time frames of the circuit efficiently. Finally, the whole procedure for our illegal 
state justification terminates when there is no unexpanded illegal state. 
So far we have discussed how to conduct illegal state extraction, expansion, and 
compaction, with available justification schemes at every circuit node. In the rest 
of the chapter, the key issue in our algorithm, how to construct these justification 
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CubeO->O^II>h„hon->i Cube1-><-^,,hpi.>n CubeM->l'C^,.hpn->n 
Cube0->0 
CubeM=Merge(Cube1,CubeO) 
(a) Backward (b) Forward (c) Dependent 
Figure 2.5: Propagation Rules for Justification Schemes 
schemes in an efficient and effective manner, is discussed in detail. 
2.5 Justification Scheme Construction 
We start our justification scheme construction at the input of each flip-flop, which 
can be obtained directly with the state of the flip-flop. We then propagate these ini-
tial justification schemes to every circuit node based on the following propagation 
rules: 
Rule 1: Backward Propagation 
A non-controlled value at the output of a logic gate (e.g., logic ‘1’ for a NOR 
gate) will imply non-controlling value for its inputs of this logic gate. Therefore, 
a justification scheme that justifies a non-controlled value at the output of a logic 
gate can be propagated to all inputs of this logic gate to justify the non-controlling 
value there, referred as backward propagation. The backward propagation of justi-
fication schemes over a two-input NOR gate is shown in Fig. 2.5(a) as an example. 
Rule 2: Forward Propagation 
A justification scheme that justifies the controlling value at any input of a logic 
gate also justifies the controlled value at its output (e.g., logic ‘1’ for an OR gate). 
If this scenario occurs, we can propagate the justification scheme from the input 
to the output directly, referred forward propagation. Similarly, an example for 
two-input NOR gate is shown in Fig. 2.5(b). 
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Figure 2.6: Generation of Sophisticated Justification Schemes 
Rule 3: Dependent Propagation 
Generally speaking, to justify a controlling value at a certain input of a logic 
gate, we need to justify its output to be the controlled value as well as all other 
inputs to be the non-controlling value. Therefore, dependency exist when propa-
gating such justification schemes and we need to merge state cubes to obtain such 
justification schemes, referred as dependent propagation. Again, an example for 
NOR gate is shown in Fig. 2.5(c). Please note that, no justification schemes would 
be generated if there is any conflict when merging state cubes. 
Let us use an example circuit (see Fig. 2.6) to show how we can build so-
phisticated justification schemes based on the above propagation rules. After ini-
tialization, three schemes FFO(l) ->A(1), FF2{\) - ^ C ( l ) and FF\{\)B{\) 
are built. Then, justification scheme FF2{\) —^  C(l) is propagated along path 
C - D - £： and we can obtain justification scheme FF2[ 1) £(0) at E. Together 
with F F l ( l ) — 5(1), we have {FF1(1),FF2(1)} — F( l ) . According to the 
above and FFO(l) - ^A( l ) , we can finally obtain {FF0(1) ,FF1(1) ,FF2(1)}— 
G(0). The last two schemes which is generated based on dependent rule cannot 
be extracted by implication based technique since such method can only generate 
justification schemes between single flip-flop and single node. 
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Figure 2.7: The Impact of Reconvergent Nodes 
justification schemes. For example, for the example circuit shown in Fig. 2.7(a), 
if we would like to propagate justification scheme FFl(O) —> £(0) backwardly, as 
logic ‘0’ is a controlled value for AND gate E, based on dependent propagation 
rule, we need to merge FFl(O) with the cube that justifies H{\) (i.e., F F l ( l ) ) 
to obtain the cube that justifies D(0). Apparently, this merging is not possible 
and hence we have to stop propagation through gate D. Consequently, we cannot 
obtain justification scheme FF 1(0) A (0) based on our earlier propagation rules. 
This justification scheme, however, does exist, because £(0) implies D(0) and/or 
H{0) while both D(0) and H{0) imply A(0). Similarly, the justification schemes 
shown in Fig. 2.7(b) cannot be obtained with the above propagation rules. A closer 
examination of the circuit shown in Fig. 2.7(a) reveals that the existence of the 
justification scheme FFl(O) —> A(0) is due to the fact that gate E is a reconvergent 
node of multi-fanout net Inl. That is, both inputs of gate E are affected by In2 
and this essentially leads to the implication of A(l) — In2{\) E(\) and hence 
FFl(O) E(0) — A(0). For the circuit in Fig. 2.7(b), even though there is no 
reconvergent node in the traditional sense, considering logic cubes are propagated 
both forwardly and backwardly, gates K and M can be also deemed as virtual 
reconvergent nodes. 
As the occurrence of the above missing justification schemes can be attributed 
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Expanded Cubes 
s208 16 If) 0 0 23 23 0 0 0 0 0 
s444 16 12 4 0 49 14 20 15 0 0 0 
s953 116 101 15 0 365 153 133 78 1 0 0 
si 196 35 10 25 0 138 10 43 42 20 23 0 
s5378 1006 293 711 2 8516 399 2584 266 2383 2884 681 
s9324 195 47 148 0 1109 47 168 108 204 582 17 
si 3207 2809 1222 1330 257 82291 1445 4156 14002 27760 34928 60140 
si 5850 507 112 392 3 5568 239 399 777 261 3892 65 
S 3 8 4 1 7 988 483 496 9 90983 864 3094 16544 34641 3 5 8 4 0 4 2 5 5 9 
S 3 8 5 8 4 1 0 6 0 9 1591 9 0 1 8 0 6 3 5 5 8 2 1 6 3 1 1 9 4 7 2 3 5 1 0 7 8 3 2 8 4 3 0 3 9 2 1 3 
Table 2.1: Experimental Results for Illegal State Identification. 
circuit node and we record those implications that lead to the same non-controlling 
value of a logic gate (if not, there is no reconverging effects). For example, by 
doing so, we can learn A(l) implies the non-controlling logic T at both inputs 
of logic gate E. Hence we have A(l) E{\) and we would record E{0) —> A(0), 
which can be used during propagation through gate E to obtain FFl(O) A(0). 
Based on the same principle, we would record A (^0) —M(0) and M(0) — K(0) 
for the circuit shown in 2.7(b), which can then be used to build the justification 
schemes shown in the figure. It is important to note that, those implications that 
do not lead to the same non-controlling value of a logic gate would be discarded, 
as they can be obtained based on our propagation rules. 
By conducting the above implication procedure before the justification scheme 
propagation process, we are able to build complete justification schemes for the 
circuit. 
CHAPTER 2. ON S YSTEMATIC ILLEGAL STATE IDENTIFICATION 34 
2.6 Experimental Results 
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed solution, we perform experiments on 
several ISCAS'89 benchmark circuits, comparing against the implication-based 
algorithm in [39], which is shown to be able to obtain much more illegal states 
than the SAT-based method in [16]. We do not compare against [31] and [38] 
because they do not store functional constraints in the format of illegal states (in 
arbitrary nets instead). Our experiments are conducted on a 2GHz PC with 1GB 
memory. 
In [39], the authors reported the total number of illegal state cubes only. Let 
us first compare this value obtained using the two algorithms, as shown in Table 
3.2 (see Columns 2 and 7). Apparently, we can find much more illegal states when 
compared to [39]. It should be also highlighted that our algorithm is generally 
more effective for those large circuits. 
As one 2-bit illegal state cube can be represented as two 3-bit illegal state 
cubes, this makes comparing the total number of illegal state cubes not quite de-
pendable. As a result, for fair comparison, we re-implement the algorithm in [39] 
and all illegal state cubes detected by the two algorithms are compacted in the 
same manner to remove redundancy ^ In Table 1, we classify all the illegal state 
cubes according to the number of specified bits. We can observe that most illegal 
state cubes detected by [39] are 2-bit or 3-bit cubes (there are no cubes with size 
more than 4). This is because their rather simple implication scheme can only 
obtain relatively small-sized functional constraints. The proposed method, on the 
other hand, is able to generate a great amount of large-sized illegal state cubes (i.e., 
cube size larger than 3). More importantly, our method also obtains much more 
2-bit and 3-bit cubes than [39], which is able to restrict the functional space more 
' D u e 10 the different implementations, our results for [39] are different from thai re-
ported in [39]. We have sent the source code for our implementation to the authors of [39]. 
CHAPTER 2. ON S YSTEMATIC ILLEGAL STATE IDENTIFICATION 35 
effectively. It can be also observed from the table that our illegal state expansion 
technique is quite effective. For certain benchmark circuits (e.g., si3207), the il-
legal cubes generated by expansion can reach nearly 80% of the total identified 
illegal states. 
Finally, we carefully examine the illegal state cubes generated from the two 
algorithms, and we find out that all the illegal states obtained in [39] are covered in 
the illegal state cubes obtained using our proposed method. This further proves that 
multi-fanout nets are the main structural root cause for functionally-unreachable 
states, and gives us more confidence to realize the potential of pseudo-functional 
testing using the proposed methodology. 
2.7 Conclusion 
The discrepancy between ICs’ activities in normal functional mode and that in 
structural test mode has an increasingly adverse impact on the effectiveness of 
manufacturing test with technology advancement, as reported in several industrial 
studies (e.g., [5, 29, 30]). Pseudo-functional testing seems to have great potential 
to resolve this problem, but whether we could realize this potential highly relies 
on whether we could effectively identify as many illegal states as possible. In 
this chapter, we show that the main structural root cause for illegal states is the 
multi-fanout nets in the circuit. Based on this observation, we develop efficient 
and effective algorithms for illegal state identification. Experimental results on 
ISCAS'89 benchmark circuits demonstrate that the proposed technique is much 
more effective when compared to state-of-the-art solutions. 





Since pseudo-functional tests need to avoid a large amount of identified illegal 
sates, the number of specified bits in pseudo-functional patterns are usually much 
larger than that of structural patterns. In other words, the percentage of X-bits 
in pseudo-functional patterns can be quite low. This has a severe impact on the 
effectiveness of test data compression techniques, since they mainly exploit X-
bits in test cubes to achieve significant test volume reduction without sacrificing 
fault coverage. Since on-chip test compression has become a de facto DfT tech-
nique used in the industry, how to effectively apply pseudo-functional patterns in 
test compression environment is a key issue for the success of pseudo-functional 
testing. 
Method [15] targeted the same problem as ours, by adding decompression 
logic into CUT and activating illegal states as constraints, they can generate the 
compressible and pseudo-functional test patterns directly. However, as number 
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of illegal states identified by our method is much larger than that used in [15], 
their method is not suitable for current situation. In this chapter, we propose novel 
compression-aware pseudo-functional testing techniques to address the above prob-
lem. Firstly, we insert functional constraints as phantom gates into the circuit so 
that the ATPG engine could take them into account automatically. Then, instead 
of activating all the functional constraints during ATPG, which inevitably leads to 
a large amount of specified bits in obtained patterns, we only activate the relevant 
ones for the targeted fault to generate compression-friendly patterns. Obviously, 
it is possible that the decompressed test patterns violate certain functional con-
straints as they are not considered. This issue is addressed by: (i). we propose 
novel heuristics to fill the free X-bits in test cubes so that the number of vio-
lated constraints is as small as possible; (ii). for the violated constraints (if any) 
that might lead to incidental test overkills, we take advantage of the available X-
tolerant compactor in TDC architecture to mask the error effects from those faults 
that are detectable only because of the illegal states. Moreover, we also show how 
to generate compressible random patterns that do not violate functional constraints, 
by applying multiple launch cycles before the actual capture cycle. Experimental 
results on ISCAS'89 benchmark circuits show the effectiveness of our proposed 
compression-aware pseudo-functional testing technique. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Chapter 3.2 reviews 
related work and motivates this chapter. In Chapter 3.3 and Chapter 3.4，we detail 
our proposed methodology for compression-aware pseudo-functional testing and 
our test pattern generation process, respectively. Experimental results on several 
large ISCAS'89 benchmark circuits are then presented in Chapter 3.5 to show the 
effectiveness of the proposed solution. Finally, Chapter 3.6 concludes this chapter. 
* P s e u d o - f u n c t i o n a l p a t t e r n s 
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3.2 Motivation 
The functionally-unreachable space for an integrated circuit can be quite large. 
Consequently, when we generate only functionally-reachable patterns during ATPG, 
the number of specified bits in pseudo-functional patterns would be much higher 
than conventional structural patterns that do not consider such functional con-
straints. Let us use benchmark circuit ^9234 as an example (see Fig. 3.1), after 
applying functional constraints, more than 80 percent of the pseudo-functional 
patterns have specified bits in the range of 20% - 30%. In contrast, only less than 
two percent of structural patterns have more than 20% specified bits. 
Since TDC techniques rely on the large percentage of X-bits in test cubes for 
efficient test data volume reduction, if we directly apply pseudo-functional pat-
terns in test compression environment, the compression ratio is reduced dramat-
ically when compared to applying traditional structural patterns. Polian and Fu-
jiwara [24] studied this issue using a code-based TDC technique and showed the 
compression ratio loss due to functional constraints. 
As on-chip test compression techniques, in particular, linear decompressor-
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Figure 3.2: Pattern Generation Framework in Compression-Aware Pseudo-
Functional Testing 
based TDC has become the de facto DfT methodology widely used in the indus-
try. How can we apply pseudo-functional tests in test compression environment 
effectively is an important and challenging problem. The above has motivated 
the compression-aware pseudo-functional testing methodology investigated in this 
chapter, as detailed in the rest of this chapter. 
D e c i -p r e s s o r M a t r i x 
r 
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3.3 Proposed Methodology 
Our proposed methodology for compression-aware pseudo-functional testing is 
based on the following observation: 
That is, Non-functional patterns do NOT always lead to over-testing. 
In another word, only if a non-functional pattern detects delay faults onfunctionally-
infeasible paths, good circuit may fail this test pattern. Therefore, instead of apply-
ing pseudo-functional patterns only, we allow non-functional patterns to be applied 
to the circuit in our proposed technique. 
By doing so, we do not need to activate all the functional constraints dur-
ing ATPG. Instead, we propose to only activate those relevant constraints for the 
targeted fault, which facilitates to generate compression-friendly test cubes with 
fewer specified bits. Obviously, it is possible that the decompressed test patterns 
violate some functional constraints as they are not considered. The question be-
comes how can we avoid test yield loss induced by these violated functional con-
straints (if any), and we tackle it as follows. 
Firstly, for a compressible test cube, typically we still have many X-bits left in 
it after solving the linear equations corresponding to its specified bits. We propose 
novel heuristics to fill them so that the number of violated functional constraints is 
as small as possible. 
Then, for the remaining violated constraints (if any), we take advantage of the 
available X-tolerant compactor in on-chip test compression architecture to mask 
the error effects from those faults that are detectable only because of the illegal 
states. To be specific, for every illegal state existing in the decompressed test pat-
tern, we break the corresponding violation by setting one of its involved state ele-
ments to be ‘X’ during fault simulation. By doing so, if a delay fault is detectable 
by a decompressed test pattern only due to the existence of the illegal states in 
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the pattern, its error effect in test response will be also ‘X，. Then, since we mask 
them in the X-tolerant compactor, such an unexpected fault becomes untestable 
with this pattern and hence the applied non-functional pattern would not result in 
test overkill. 
In conventional broad-side delay testing, we typically apply two-pattern tests, 
i.e., one cycle for launch and one cycle for capture. If we are able to apply mul-
tiple launch cycles before the capture cycle, however, the chance to have non-
functional patterns during capture is significantly reduced [18]. The reason is sim-
ple: instead of being scanned in with any possible values, the applied patterns have 
gone through the functional logic for several cycles and are largely functionally-
constrained (not guaranteed though, due to the initial illegal launch pattern). While 
introducing multiple launch cycles in the deterministic test pattern generation pro-
cess is usually prohibited due to the associated huge computational complexity, we 
propose to apply multi-launch cycles for random patterns, which is able to avoid 
over-testing without incurring high ATPG effort. 
Based on the above, the overall framework for our compression-aware pseudo-
functional testing methodology is presented in Fig. 3.2. It is worth noting that, 
while this framework is generic enough to be applicable for detecting any kinds 
of faults in linear decompressor-based test compression environment when over-
testing is of a concern, we focus on transition faults in this work and we assume 
broad-side testing is applied to detect them. The pattern generation procedure is 
detailed in the following subchapter. 
PPI Phantom Gates " legal States 
OA(像⑴} 
Figure 3.3: Insertion and Activation of Functional Constraints as Phantom Gates 
3.4 Pattern Generation in Compression-Aware Pseudo-
Functional Testing 
As shown in Fig. 3.2, our proposed pattern generation framework takes the circuit 
netlist, the transformation matrix for the linear decompressor and the functional 
constraints (i.e., illegal state cubes) in the circuit extracted using the tool proposed 
in chapter 2 as inputs and output compression-aware input vectors to be stored 
in the ATE. It is comprised of three main phases: circuit pre-processing, pseudo-
functional random pattern generation and compression-aware deterministic pattern 
generation for pseudo-functional testing. 
3.4.1 Circuit Pre-Processing 
In the circuit pre-processing phase, we first expand the circuit into two time frames, 
by changing the internal flip-flops to be pseudo-primary inputs (PPIs) and pseudo-
primary outputs (PPOs). 
Then, for the functional constraints that are given as illegal state cubes (e.g., 
{A(0),C(1)}), different from prior work that represents such constraints as in-
dependent formulas in conjunctive normal form (CNF) during the ATPG pro-
cess [19], we insert phantom logic AND gates into the circuit to represent them, 
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as shown in the example in Fig. 3.3. Each phantom gate corresponds to an illegal 
state by linking its corresponding PPIs (directly or through an inverter), and its 
output would be logic ‘ 1 ’ if and only if a fully specified test pattern contains this 
illegal state. 
The above representation has several advantages: (i). the ATPG engine does 
not need to maintain a great number of independent CNF formulas; (ii). by in-
tegrating functional constraints into the circuit, it is more convenient to generate 
pseudo-functional patterns since we only need to set the outputs of the phantom 
AND gates as logic ‘0，and label them as an unjustified value. The ATPG engine 
will automatically take such functional constraints into account, (iii). we have 
the flexibility to activate a subset of the functional constraints in each ATPG run, 
which is important for our proposed methodology, as shown in Chapter 3.3. 
3.4.2 Pseudo-Functional Random Pattern Generation with Multi-
Launch Cycles 
The functionally-unreachable space for an integrated circuit can be quite large. 
Take the ISCAS'89 benchmark circuit s9234 as an example, we can obtain forty 
seven 2-bit illegal state cubes. 
For each of the 2-bit illegal state, a random pattern has 3/4 probability to avoid 
it, but the probability will decrease to (3/4)" if there are n independent 2-bit ille-
gal states. Directly applying random test patterns, therefore, is almost certain to 
violate one or more functional constraints. 
Fortunately, as discussed earlier, if we apply multiple launch cycles before the 
capture cycle, the chance for a test pattern to be a functional pattern is significantly 
increased. Based on this observation, we propose to generate pseudo-functional 
random patterns with the algorithm shown in Fig. 3.4. 
In line 1, we initialize a variable Num.Valid-Pattern to be zero. Then, in each 
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Num.ValidJ'attern=0\ 
whihiNiim.Valid J'aiteni < 16) { 
Generate 32 random input vectors //^{32}; 
Obtain 32 patterns S/'{32} in the first launch cyclc; 
for(( = 0;i < NiiiiiJRandom.Cycles-, i++) { 
Simulate 5P{32}, output OP{32}; 
SP{32} = C;P{32};} 
A'u/H.Va/W.ftjf?c'r/i=Constraint.Check(OP{32});} 
A'MmJ5e/ec7crf.Fai</i=faul.simulation(OP{32}); 
if(,Num.Det eel ed.Faul I s\=Q){ 
update.faulllistO; 
goto line 1;} 
else 
terminale; 
Figure 3.4: Algorithm for Pseudo-Functional Random Test Pattern Generation. 
iteration (lines 2-10), we generate 32 random input vectors V{32} supplied to 
the linear decompressor (by taking advantage of the parallel fault simulator). By 
doing so, the test vectors applied in the first launch cycle 5P{32} are guaranteed 
to be compressible. Next, we conduct functional simulation for a consecutive of 
NumJiandomJCycle cycles, which is a pre-defined value for the launch cycles and 
it is set as four in our experiment, to obtain the actual test patterns applied in the 
capture cycle O尸{32}. 
Next, we check how many patterns in OP{32} do not violate any functional 
constraints, and record it in NumJValid J^attern. If Num-Valid J^attern is equal or 
larger than 16, we conduct fault simulation for this batch of test patterns. Other-
wise, they are abandoned. The idea behind this is that fault simulation takes longer 
time than logic simulation and we do not want to waste time to simulate only few 
functionally-constrained patterns. 
Note that, we only conduct fault simulation with those patterns in OP{32} 
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Figure 3.5: Effective Fan-in Cone for a Fault. 
that do not violate any functional constraints and the number of detected faults 
is stored in NumJ)etectedJ^aults. If we able to detect any new transition faults 
with these patterns, the procedure goes back to line 1 to generate another batch 
of random patterns. Otherwise, we abort random pattern generation and resort to 
deterministic patterns to cover the remaining faults, as detailed in the following 
subchapters. 
3.4.3 Compressible Test Pattern Generation for Pseudo-Functional 
Testing 
We implement a constrained ATPG engine based on the FAN algorithm [9] for de-
terministic pattern generation. In such an ATPG engine, we can put the values for 
internal gates as to-be-justified values and we are able to backtrack to try another 
solution whenever a logic conflict occurs. 
Dynamic Activation of Functional Constraints 
As discussed earlier, the illegal states in large ICs are enormous and if we activate 
all of them in test compression environment, dramatic fault coverage loss would 
be incurred because we are not able to generate many compressible patterns that 
O b s e r v a t i o n 
P o i n t 
E f f e c t i v e 
F u n i n
 C o n e 
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satisfy such large number of constraints. 
In our proposed methodology, when generating a deterministic pattern for a 
particular transition fault, we only activate its relevant functional constraints (sim-
ply by assigning logic ‘0’ at the output of its corresponding phantom gate), which 
is obtained as follows. During the ATPG process, the targeted fault propagates its 
faulty value to POs or PPOs (referred as observation points). For each observa-
tion point, we define its fan-in logic cone as an effective fan-in cone (E-cone) for 
the targeted fault (see Fig. 3.5). Since, if we want to detect the fault with a par-
ticular observation point, only those functional constraints existing in its E-cone 
can affect the detection of this fault, they are defined as the relevant functional 
constraints and therefore need to be activated during test generation. 
Note that, there may exist more than one propagation path for a fault, and they 
correspond to different observation points and hence different E-cones for this 
fault. Our constrained ATPG tool selects one of them in each run and backtracks 
to try another one if conflicts occur (e.g., a functional constraint within its E-cone 
is violated or the pattern is not compressible). Whenever backtracking occurs, 
we dynamically activate a new set of functional constraints and at the same time 
de-activate the previous functional constraints. 
Constraint-Aware Input Vector Generation 
Whenever we generate a deterministic test pattern P, we need to check whether 
this pattern is compressible (see Chapter 3.2.3). If not, we try to generate a differ-
ent pattern. Otherwise, we need to solve the linear equations corresponding to the 
specified bits and get the input vector V for this pattern. Since a compressible test 
cube may have more than one solution, for the ease of pseudo-functional testing, 
we would like to have a solution that violates the least number of functional con-
straints (if any). A greedy heuristic is proposed in this subchapter to achieve the 
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1. V=getinitialV(); 
2. Gom=IFINITE; 
3. while(Ca/Vi = = 0) { 
4. MGain = Gain = QMhit = - 1 ; 
5. P=M X V: 
6. A''/wi.V/o=violation-checking(P); 
/* select a bit which reduce the most constraints*/ 
7. lor(/ = 0; i < Niim.Vhif,/ + +) { 
"sk ip if this bit pivot input bit or it has been flipped*/ 
8. if(i.s.pivolbii(V[i]) II has.nipped(V/[i])) 
9. continue; 
nip(v[(])； 
P = MxV\ 
Gtfm=NHw.Vio-violation.checking(P): 
flip(V ['•]); 
[{(Gain > MGain) { 
5. MGain = Gain.. 
6. Mbit = (•;} 
Gain = MGain-,} 
ifiGain > 0) 
flip(V[Mb/V]);} 
Figure 3.6: Algorithm for Constraint-Aware Input Vector Generation. 
above objective. 
Before introducing our algorithm, we first divide all the bits in an input vector 
into three categories: pivot-bits, free-bits and stack-bits, which correspond to pivot 
columns, all zero columns and the rest columns in the reduced coefficient matrix 
M � . Take the example reduced augmented matrix shown in Eq. 1.3 as an example 
(see Chapter 3.2.3), the pivot-bits are ^i, S2, 54 and V5； the free-bits are 53, vi, V3 
and V6； while V2 is a stack-bit. 
When solving the equations, the value for the pivot-bits are determined and 
CHAPTER 3. COMPRESSION-AWARE PSEUDO-FUNCTIONAL TESTINGS 1 
they are equal to the scalar multiplication between P; and the corresponding pivot 
column (e.g., = (1 0 0 0) • (0 1 0 0)^ = 0), stack-bits can be set as 0，free-bits 
can be freely assigned with 0/1. Therefore, for this example, we can get an initial 
solution as V = (0, 1，1, 0, 0，0, 1, 0, 0, 1 , , where the bold values represent 
those bits that are fixed. 
Starting from a given input vector, we define a flip(i,V) operation that trans-
forms V from current solution to another valid solution by flipping the bit in V 
provided it is not a pivot-bit. Apparently, for free-bits, they can be freely flipped. 
However, the flipping of a stack-bit involves flipping some other bits to guaran-
tee the generated vector is valid. Let us demonstrate how this is done by flipping 
stack-bit V2. We first scan in its corresponding column in M( (i.e., (1, 0, 1, 0)^), 
and then we find all the non-zero entries (the first entry and the third one) and 
locate the pivots in the same rows (i.e., 1) and M^(4,3)). Pivot bits of input 
vector which correspond to the first and forth columns also need to be flipped, and 
we can obtain a new valid input vector V=(l, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1). 
Based on the above, Fig. 3.6 presents the pseudo-code of our proposed constraint-
aware input vector generation algorithm. V, P and M represent the input vector, the 
test pattern and the transformation matrix, respectively. Procedure violation^checking(P) 
returns the number of violated functional constraints in pattern P and NumJVio is 
used to record this value. Gain represents the reduced number of violated func-
tional constraints benefited from a////?() operation. MGain denotes the maximum 
gain that we can achieve by flipping one bit in current input vector and Mbit is the 
index to that bit. Our algorithm starts from an initial input vector, and then enters 
a while loop to iteratively reduce the number of violated functional constraints. In 
each iteration, we try to flip one free-bit or stack-bit in V and evaluate the Gain, and 
we select the bit with the maximum Gain to flip. Finally, the algorithm terminates 
itself when there is no Gain any more. 
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iniiializalionO; 
/*break more constraints with lessX-assignmenl*/ 
�vhile(TRUE){ 
index = getmaxvioIation(); 





" f o r a particular constraint, select to assign X to the PPl 
that makes potential X-response distributed more evenly*/ 
10. \s\\\\t{yiolaiedJConstramis is not emply){ 
11. Constraint = \^QyA{Violated-Const raints)\ 
12. M//iCav/=INFlNITE, Cayr=0，MPP!=-1 ； 
"se lec t a PPl from illegal cube making 
potential X response distributing evenly*/ 
13. for(/=0;/ < Constraint./Vwm;/++) 
/*cosl is the standard variation of ScanJCoimi*! 
14. Cost-%Qico%K(Constraint, /, Scan.Count)\ 
15. ifiCost < MinCost){ 
16. MinCost = Cost\ 
17. MPPI = i\}} 
18. Assign Constrainf.P![MFPI] as X; 
19. \}pd^Xcxonsiram(ViolatedJConstraints)\ 
20. upciate-effeci-ocone(.S'crtn-Cr7/^/// )；} 
Figure 3.7: Algorithm for Constraint-Aware X-Assignment. 
Constraint-Aware X-Assignment 
After the above input vector generation process, we have the fully-specified de-
compressed patterns and they may contain some illegal states since we only acti-
vate a few relevant functional constraints in our constrained ATPG tool. 
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Suppose we have a test pattern P containing an illegal state (p\ = 0’ p3 = 0), as 
discussed earlier, we can break it by assigning either p\ = X or p2 = X^ and mask 
the error effects in our X-tolerant compactor. The two choices, however, may lead 
to multiple X-bits in the test response, denoted as X-response hereafter. Recall that 
the X-compactor used in our design is able to tolerate only one X-bit in each scan 
slice, a bad choice may lead to significantly long runtime as we need to backtrack 
to try other choices. 
While we can obtain the detailed information for X-response of each choice by 
conducting simulation, it is not wise to try out for all the options due to the as-
sociated high computational complexity, especially considering the decompressed 
pattern may violate many functional constraints. Therefore, we propose a novel 
heuristic to guide our X-assignment process, based on the impact of the PPIs that 
are involved in violated functional constraints and structural analysis for the cir-
cuit, as shown in Fig. 3.7. 
Since X value on a PPI can only be propagated to its fanout cone, we use the 
distribution of fanout cone to evaluate the impact of a PPL For a circuit under 
test containing n PPIs (i.e., scan cells) and m scan slices, for each PPI[i] that is 
involved in an illegal state, we count, in advance, how many PPOs in its fan-out 
cone are located on each scan slice, and this information is stored in a 2-dimension 
matrix PP.Count[n x m]. The entry PP-Count[iJ] record the number of PPOs in 
the fan-out cone of PPI[i] that are located in the scan slice. Vector Scan.Count 
is the summation of all the row PP^Count[i] where the corresponding PPI[i\ has 
been assigned as an unknown value (i.e., X). Violated-Constraints denotes all 
violated constraints. 
In the beginning of our algorithm, function initialization() is applied to con-
struct the matrix PP-Count and to reset the vector Scan-Count. Afterwards, we 
Note, Pi or P2 is treated as an unknown value X、their values are still pi = 0 and p3 = 0 in the 
actual applied pattern. 
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apply X-assignment intelligently via two loops, which tackle this problem from 
two different angles. 
In our X-compactor, the number of X-response bits within each scan slice can-
not exceed 1. Based on the observation that less X-bits in PPIs induce less X-
response bits, an intuitive method is to use a few X-bits to break as many violated 
functional constraints as possible, which motivates the procedure conducted in 
the first while loop (lines 2-9). Function getmaxviolation() returns the index of the 
PPI that is involved with the largest number of violated functional constrains. This 
procedure returns -1 if no PPI is involved in more than one violated constraints. X 
is always assigned to those PPIs that gives us the most benefit referring to maxi-
mum violated constraints reduction, and then we update Violated jConstraints and 
Scan.Count. Finally, we jump out this loop when there is no overlapping of PPIs 
between violated functional constraints or all of them have been broken. 
The idea behind the second while loop (lines 10-20) is that we wish the poten-
tial X-response position to be evenly distributed on different scan slices. Since the 
Scan-Count records the distribution of X-response, we use the standard variation 
of Scan-Count as cost function. Constraint represents the functional constraint 
that is currently targeted, which has two members: Constraint.Num. is the number 
of PPh in its illegal cube, and Constraint .PPI is an array pointed to its corre-
sponding PPIs. Variable MPPI is the index pointed to the most beneficial PPI. 
Focusing on one violated Constraint in each iteration, the method tries to find 
pseudo-primary input Constraint.PPI[i\ within its illegal state cubes with min-
imal cost and assign it as X. Function get cost adds the row corresponding to 
Constraint.PPI[i] in matrix PP-Count with Scan-Count, and returns the standard 
variation. After assigning X to Constraint.PPI[MPPI], we update the values of 
Violated.Constraints and ScanJCount. The procedure for X-Assignment termi-
nates when either all the functional constraints have been broken or we find out 
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Benchmark 
Conventional Structural ATPG Pseudo-Functional ATPG FCA - FCtt 
(%) FCA (%) ave^pe ( % ) CPU time (s) FCn (%) avejipe (%) CPU lime (s) 
s382 82.105 30.037 0.033 78.663 48.186 0.017 3 . 4 4 2 
si 238 95.957 22.609 0.233 90.352 56.522 0.173 5.605 
s5378 87.915 8.032 8.467 83.413 44.578 12.917 4 . 5 0 2 
S 9 2 3 4 88.806 8.834 69.717 83.396 26.148 33.517 5 . 4 1 0 
si 3207 89.395 2.493 23.333 86.368 33.228 131.983 3 . 0 2 7 
si 5850 86.099 3.634 65.900 84.524 17.878 77.083 1 . 5 7 5 
S 3 8 4 1 7 98.463 2.069 194.017 95.695 12.648 545.32 2 , 7 6 8 
S 3 8 5 8 4 93.961 1.997 226.283 89.133 39.86 705.62 4.828 
Table 3.1: Conventional Structural ATPG vs. Pseudo-Functional ATPG for Tran-
sition Faults. 
that some constraints cannot be broken and then we need to abandon this test pat-
tern. 
It should be noted that, as our X-compactor can tolerate one X-bit in a scan 
slice provided that no greater than two bits are used to detect faults, if during fault 
simulation, a particular fault results in more than two error bits for a scan slice 
with an X-bit, this fault is deemed to be undetected with this pattern. 
3.5 Experimental Results 
3.5.1 Experimental Setup 
We implement our proposed compression-aware pseudo-functional pattern gener-
ation framework targeting transition faults on top of an academic ATPG tool Ata-
lanta [13], which originally targets stuck-at faults using the FAN algorithm [9]. 
We extract the functional constraints with the tool proposed in chapter 2. Ex-
periments are conducted on various ISCAS'89 benchmark circuits, and the linear 
decompressors that we use in our experiments consist of an 8-bit ring generator 
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Aborted faults 
FU faults: functionally 
S* /Regulated DIU faults: decompressor-
y detectable / induced untestable faults 
SU faults: Structurally untestable 
Figure 3.8: Regulated Detectable Faults 
(with either 2-input vector or 4-input vector) and an 8-to-20 phase shifter. 
Table 1 presents the test pattern generation results for transition faults using 
conventional structural ATPG and pseudo-functional ATPG, in which FC denotes 
fault coverage while avejspe represents the average percentage of specified bits 
in test patterns. It can be easily observed that, by taking the functional constraints 
into consideration, the fault coverage with only pseudo-functional patterns is lower 
than that of conventional structural ATPG, mainly due to the structurally testable 
while functionally untestable faults existing in the circuit. At the same time, we 
can observe that the number of specified bits in pseudo-functional patterns is much 
larger than that of conventional structural ATPG. 
Since there are many reasons for ATPG tool to abort detecting a fault, before 
demonstrating our experimental results, we first define a concept namely regulated 
detectable faults to make fair comparison among different approaches. As can be 
seen in Fig. 3.8，we have structurally-untestable faults (SU faults), functionally-
untestable faults (FU faults), and decompressor-induced untestable faults (DIU 
faults), and also some hard-to-detect faults that are aborted. Apparently, for com-
pressible patterns targeting functionally-testable faults with a given ATPG tool, the 
faults we are after are only the rest of the faults, defined as regulated detectable 
faults. 
To generate test patterns for the above regulated faults for fair comparison, we 
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rco-i-VK FCo-FCro Pattern lucrease{%) 
s382 74.869 77 0.1 43.512 42 55.759 56 0.133 73.298 65 0.15 • 1.571 17.539 -15.58 
SI238 77.872 332 1.5 50.387 208 5X617 219 3.000 76.277 340 1.583 -1.595 22.66 2.41 
！;5378 79.586 614 7.883 49.756 257 49.756 257 144.217 79.103 656 29.783 -0.483 29.347 6.84 
S 9 2 3 4 74.811 931 55.383 43.687 437 43.687 437 159.45 73.447 981 85.883 •1.364 29.76 5.37 
si 3207 84.01 \ 968 83.205 42.953 365 42.953 365 1314.383 83.036 1 1 9 2 -0.'>7S 40.083 23.14 
s15850 82.259 11H4 64.9 62.086 5 6 2 62.086 5 6 2 511.817 81.493 1174 90.3 - ( K 7 6 6 19.407 -0.84 
S 3 8 4 I 7 
S 3 8 5 8 4 
9 5 . 5 7 1 
8 8 . 1 4 2 
3 1 0 2 
2 2 5 4 
2 1 8 . 8 8 3 
3 8 2 . 1 5 7 
7 4 . 6 9 8 
7 1 . 6 0 8 
9 8 5 
W 
7 5 . 8 9 
72.873 
9 9 6 
9 4 1 
3 2 6 0 
5338.233 
9 5 . 3 7 
87.525 
3 0 5 7 
2 4 6 2 
1925.583 
2 8 5 ! . 8 1 7 
• 0 . 2 0 1 





Average -0.946 24.116 3.064 
Table 3.2: Results with 2-Input Decompressor. 
first conduct pseudo-functional APTG and take its detectable fault list as the input 
to a compression-aware ATPG to obtain the regulated detectable fault list and their 
corresponding test patterns. It should be noted the runtime reported for the above 
regulated ATPG process is only the compression-aware ATPG runtime. 
3.5.2 Results and Discussion 
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 present detailed comparison for the test pattern generation 
results from three approaches: regulated ATPG, ATPG in test compression envi-
ronment with all functional constraints enabled, and our proposed compression-
aware pseudo-functional ATPG, with 2-input linear decompressor and 4-input lin-
ear decompressor, respectively. 
From these tables, we can observe that, if all the functional constraints are en-
abled in test compression environment, the fault coverage {FCjo in Column 7) 
suffers from great loss when compared to regulated ATPG {FCR in Column 2). As 
a matter of fact, it can be observed that most of the detected faults are covered by 
our multi-launch pseudo-functional random patterns (see FCRS in Column 5). For 
example, for s9234 with 4-input decompressor, only 2 deterministic patterns are 
generated to cover extra faults. This is expected, since when all the functional con-
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Table 3.3: Results with 4-Input Decompressor. 
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Figure 3.9: Runtime Comparison. 
straints are activated, the patterns generated from the ATPG engine contains a large 
number of specified bits and it is very unlikely that such patterns are compressible. 
Consequently, in most cases, the ATPG engine backtracks multiple times to try 
different patterns and eventually aborts to detect the targeted faults. This also ex-
plains why the runtime for this kind of ATPG is the longest (Column 9)，even 
though it only generate limited or even zero deterministic patterns. 
With our proposed method that only activates the relevant functional con-
straints for the targeted fault, the fault coverage loss when compared to the reg-
ulated ATPG case is quite small, with at most 1.6% and on average 0.946% (Col-
umn 14) for the case with 2-input decompressor. The fault coverage loss with the 
4-input decompressor case are even smaller, on average 0.473%. When compared 
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to the ATPG method that activates all the functional constraints, the fault coverage 
increases by around 25% for both decompressor cases (Column 15). As can be 
seen from the last column in both tables, our proposed compression-aware APTG 
has a slightly higher test pattern count when compared to the regulated ATPG 
case (around 3% on average). This is because, for a particular pattern that violate 
certain functional constraints, since we need to mask the error effects from those 
faults that are detectable due to the existence of illegal states in the pattern, these 
faults are deemed as untestable with this pattern, requiring other patterns to cover 
it. There are also some cases that our ATPG tool leads to fewer test patterns, and 
we attribute this phenomenon to the uncertainty for the faults covered by random 
patterns. 
In addition, we compare runtime of our proposed method with traditional struc-
tural ATPG and normal pseudo-functional ATPG. It is shown in fig.3.9，runtime of 
our proposed method increases faster as the scaling of circuit size, because it needs 
to spend more time on X-assignment for those patterns containing illegal states. 
3.6 Conclusion 
With technology scaling, the discrepancy between integrated circuits' activities in 
normal functional mode and that in structural test mode has an increasing adverse 
impact on the effectiveness of manufacturing test. Pseudo-functional testing has 
been proposed to resolve this issue, but the generated patterns typically feature 
much less X-bits when compared to conventional structural patterns. Directly ap-
plying such patterns in test compression environment hence may lead to significant 
fault coverage loss. In this chapter, we propose novel compression-aware pseudo-
functional testing techniques to tackle the above problem. Experimental results on 
ISCAS'89 benchmark circuits show that our proposed solution is able to achieve 
similar fault coverage as conventional structural patterns, without incurring over-
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testing to the circuits. 
• End of chapter. 
Chapter 4 
Conclusion and Future Work 
The discrepancy between ICs，activities in normal functional mode and that in 
structural test mode has an increasingly adverse impact on the effectiveness of 
manufacturing test with technology advancement, as reported in several industrial 
studies (e.g., [5’ 29’ 30]). 
Pseudo-functional testing has great potential to resolve the above problem, but 
whether we could realize this potential highly relies on whether we could effec-
tively identify as many illegal states as possible. In this dissertation, we show that 
the main structural root cause for illegal states is the multi-fanout nets in the circuit. 
Based on this, we develop efficient and effective illegal state identification algo-
rithms. Experimental results on ISCAS'89 benchmark circuits demonstrate that 
the proposed technique is much more effective when compared to state-of-the-art 
solutions. 
As pseudo-functional test patterns typically feature much less X-bits when 
compared to conventional structural patterns, directly applying such patterns in 
test compression environment may lead to significant fault coverage loss. In this 
dissertation, we propose novel compression-aware pseudo-functional testing tech-
niques to tackle the above problem. Experimental results on ISCAS'89 benchmark 
8 5 
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circuits show that our proposed solution is able to achieve similar fault coverage 
as conventional structural patterns, without incurring over-testing to the circuits. 
There are several important topics yet to explore for future work. Firstly, while 
this thesis work facilitate to avoid over-testing by generating patterns that are more 
function-like, under-testing may happen since the current solution cannot guaran-
tee to sensitize the worst case delay for the circuit in at-speed delay testing. The 
fundamental problem in delay testing is, How can we exercise the worst-case tim-
ing of the circuits under test in their functional mode during manufacturing test? 
We plan to take our extracted functional constraints into ATPG and try to generate 
patterns that activate the maximum electrical noises on targeted delay faults in our 
future work. Secondly, effective removal of false paths from static timing analysis 
(STA) is a critical task, because STA is used in the inner loop of many circuit opti-
mization tools to resolve timing issues and the effectiveness of such optimization 
processes is deteriorated with the presence of false paths, leading to sub-optimal 
solution or even failure to achieve timing closure. Existing techniques, however, 
regard a path as a true path as long as a vector pair can be found to sensitize it. This 
is rather pessimistic since such a path might be activated only with illegal states 
in the circuit and hence it is actually functionally-unsensitizable. Hence, with the 
help of this thesis work, it is possible to identify more false paths in the circuit, 
thus dramatically improving the efficiency of STA tools. 
• End of chapter. 
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